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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technological advance that has caught the 
attention of many people.  Hailed by some for its ability to overshadow the present day 
barcode as well as track objects, RFID technology is also ridiculed by many others for 
reasons that include very little security, minimal privacy, and ethical and legal issues.  While 
RFID has the potential to change the way we interact with items on a day-to-day basis, 
without proper attention, regulation, and security, this technology could prove to be a key 
that opens Pandora’s box. 
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CHAPTER 1:  Introduction 
 
 
Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a technological advance that has excited 
many because of the potential it possesses - the potential to do much public good, yet just as 
much potential to do harm.  It has amassed a following because of the convenience, speed, 
and reliability it is said to hold.  Unfortunately, there is concern over the use of RFID 
because of the minimal privacy and security it holds as well as the social issues it raises.  
 
As we progress further into the 21st century, it is likely that radio frequency 
identification, a technology that uses radio frequencies to identify an object or set of objects, 
will continue to grow and expand beyond our wildest dreams.  Because of its apparent 
rooting in supply-chain management, we can at the very least see it utilized by companies for 
management purposes and replacing the modern day barcode.  However, with mention of a 
desire to create a global network of objects [1] and the application of RFID to humans, one 
cannot help but to ponder the security of RFID systems and the implications of taking it to 
the extreme of tagging everything and everyone.   
 
We are not very far away from the reality of a global network of objects as the 
technology is now inconspicuously present in day-to-day life; most people use some form of 
it everyday, yet may not be aware of it.  However, as RFID has increasingly gained media 
attention, different groups have asserted concerns over privacy while others have taken their 
concern over security to the test bench, proving that the technology is not as secure as it 
should be for some current and proposed uses, such as for credit card transactions and 
electronic passports (e-passports).  
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Despite these concerns, there is an apparent move to press on with further integration 
of RFID into objects used daily with the intent of providing additional speed, efficiency, 
reliability, and ultimately security.  (Yes, in spite of concerns that RFID is not very secure, 
one of the ideas behind using an RFID system is to provide some form of extra security.)  So, 
how can successful use of this technology coexist with fears and concerns of privacy 
invasion and security risks?   
 
This document will address issues dealing with the security and social implications 
surrounding passive, low frequency RFID systems.  While an interest is maintained in all 
applications of RFID, a major focus is given to an area that has caused a round of 
controversy and is well suited for the question that has been posed – the implantation of 
RFID chips into humans. Finally, the concept of fingerprinting RFID signals is presented as a 
way to add additional security to an RFID system.  The viability of this technique is 
discussed along with experimental results, and the positive and negative consequences of its 
implementation.   
 
1.1. Historical Overview 
Although historically it was not the most pleasant of times, World War II served as a 
catalyst for growth in radio communications, more specifically, the unprecedented birth of 
RFID.  With Radio Detection and Ranging (RADAR) being introduced by 1935, it was 
inevitable that the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system, a system mentioned in [2] as 
being a basis for RFID, would soon follow.   
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Prior to officially being introduced as IFF by the British in the late 1930’s, the system 
was derived from a method in which German airplane pilots would roll their planes when 
nearing German RADAR systems.  This resulted in a change in the signal received on the 
ground, allowing their countrymen to know whether or not the on-coming aircraft was indeed 
German.  This method has been noted as the first passive RFID system in [2], although the 
British are officially credited with this in the form of IFF.   
 
By 1945, yet another device penned as an early version of RFID was developed.  
Inventor, physicist, and musician Leon Theremin invented a device that was to be used as a 
tool of espionage by the Russian government.  The device, historically known as “The 
Thing”, was a passive listening device embedded in a plaque given to U.S. Ambassador 
Averell Harriman by a group of school children [1,3].  The Thing only operated when a 
certain frequency was directed toward it.   
 
Development of RFID continued throughout the years as one of the first papers 
relative to RFID communication, “Communication by Means of Reflected Power” by Harry 
Stockman, was published in the October 1948 issue of the Proceedings of the IRE.  By 1950, 
major experimentation was underway while the 1960’s saw the introduction of electronic 
article surveillance (EAS) systems in stores for theft protection.  
 
Work on RFID systems continued into the 1970’s, which provided a number of RFID 
influenced projects, including what are considered to be the first of numerous patents granted 
under the influence of RFID.  The first, “Transponder Apparatus & System” filed by 
Cardullo and Parks in 1970, was granted in 1973 and is credited as an active RFID system 
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[2,4].  The second, “Remotely Powered Transponder” filed by Works, Murray, Ostroff, and 
Freedman in 1971, was also granted in 1973 and is credited as keyless entry [2,5].  The 70’s 
is also a time in which new suggestions such as electronic toll collection would arise [6].   
 
By the 1980’s, many of the concepts under development in the 70’s were actually 
implemented and by 1991, the first RFID based toll collection system was implemented in 
Oklahoma.  Fast-forward to 2006 and RFID may be found in an array of items used such as 
automobile remote keyless entry, pet identification systems, library books, patient 
identification systems, etc.  There are also a number of other things under development as we 
move into the future with this technology.  As we push forward, RFID is expected to replace 
the barcode and enter into the home in ways that can only be imagined.   
 
1.2. How RFID Works 
As shown in Figure 1, RFID technology is composed of three main components: the 
tag (transponder), the reader (transceiver), and the database.  Of these, the transponder is 
likely the most versatile as there are a number of factors that result in it being ideal for a 
particular application.  There are about four distinct components to note within it:  its source 
of power, whether or not it is reprogrammable, its frequency, and its mode and method of 
sending and receiving data.   
 
Figure 1 - An RFID System comprised of a transponder, reader, and database. 
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The method by which the tag receives its power is classified into two categories:  
active and passive.  The active tag source is very straightforward – it uses a battery and can 
be rendered inoperable if the battery is missing, defective, or depleted.  Alternatively, the 
passive tag receives its power from the RF signal sent from the reader or the magnetic field 
emitted from the reader’s antenna.  There are several ways in which this is done:  close 
coupling and inductive coupling use the magnetic field of the reader antenna, while long 
range devices require electromagnetic (EM) waves.  In passive tags, the method for receiving 
power has a high influence on the range of the device – the ranges that may be achieved 
include 0 ~ 1cm for close coupling, 0 ~ 1m for inductive coupling, and 1 ~ 3m for long range 
[7]. 
 
Most transponders may be programmed during the manufacturing process.  For those 
that are read-only, a unique serial code or identification number may be programmed so that 
it cannot be altered later.   For those that allow read-write access (programmable), three main 
types of memory are considered:  EEPROM (electrically erasable programmable read only 
memory), FRAM (ferromagnetic random access memory), and SRAM (static random access 
memory) [7].  According to [7], the read-write procedure may take place by way of a state-
machine or microprocessor. 
   
The frequency at which the RFID system operates is the most important element in 
terms of communication and range.  According to [7], “The operating frequency of an RFID 
system is the frequency at which the reader transmits.”  Currently, RFID can operate within 
four frequency bands, most of which are in the Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) 
Band:  the low-frequency band (LF), the high-frequency band (HF), the ultrahigh-frequency 
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band (UHF), and the microwave band [7-11].  When operating within the LF band, the 
frequency may range from 125 to 134.5kHz.  Operation in the HF band is limited to 
13.56MHz, while operation in the UHF band may range from 868MHz to 956MHz and also 
includes the 463MHz band.  The Microwave band usually sees operation around 2.45GHz 
although operation may also occur at 5.8GHz [7,11].   
  
The frequency ranges given are general: only the ranges listed for the LF and HF 
bands are recognized internationally while ranges within the UHF and Microwave bands are 
regulated by country.  For example, in the UHF band, the United States allows operation in 
the range of 902MHz to 908MHz.  However, it is subject to regulation by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) CFR 47 Part 15.247 (although sections 245 and 249 
should be consulted as well).   Europe allows operation within the range of 865MHz to 
868MHz, where regulation is subject to the European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI) while Japan and China do not allow any operation within the 868MHz to 
956MHz range [10].  
  
 Each band has its advantages, disadvantages, and restrictions.  It seems as if the very 
disadvantages for certain bands are the advantages for the other bands.  For example, the 
disadvantage for the LF and HF bands is their lack of range, while range is an advantage for 
using the UHF and Microwave bands.  Alternatively a disadvantage for the UHF and 
Microwave bands is that certain materials such as liquids and metal may absorb the signal, 
while the LF and HF bands are minimally affected [10].    
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The methods in which the data may be sent and received include backscatter, load 
modulation, sub-harmonics, and the generation of harmonics; while the modes in which the 
data may be sent and received include full duplex, half-duplex, and sequential [7]. 
Additionally, there are various types of coding and modulation schemes used in tag-reader 
communication.  According to [7], the baseband coding techniques used in the technology 
include NRZ, Manchester, Unipolar RZ, Differential Biphase (DBP), Miller, Differential, 
and Pulse-Pause (PPC). Although there is no particular standard for modulation, the 
modulation techniques typically used include amplitude shift keying (ASK), phase shift 
keying (PSK), and frequency shift keying (FSK).  [7] mentions that any other modulation 
techniques used are variations of those given above. 
 
The excitement surrounding RFID and its anticipated replacement of the universal 
barcode is focused not only on its expected variety of uses, but the cost involved with using 
them. Many manufacturers will be expected to produce tags for supply chain management 
and identification for less than the U.S. $0.50 each [12].  While it appears that the cost of 
using a barcode is limited to the cost of obtaining a unique number and the ink used to print 
the codes on products, the expected cost of 50 cents per tag does appear to be costly.  
However, one must also consider the fact that the tag could possibly pay for itself as it is 
expected to have multiple uses. 
 
1.3 Summary of Remaining Chapters 
The remaining chapters are focused on developing issues with and exploring the 
security and social implications of RFID. Chapter 2 highlights contributions to the discussion 
of security and social implications of RFID.  Applications of RFID will be reviewed in 
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Chapter 3 while introducing arguments some RFID proponents and opponents make for or 
against use of the technology.  Chapter 4 is focused on the social implications of RFID and 
also serves as a segue into the discussion on security presented in Chapter 5.  Finally, a 
security alternative is presented in Chapter 6, which outlines the technique of fingerprinting 
signals.   
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CHAPTER 2:  Contributions to the Study of RFID Security & Social Implications  
 
2.1. Contributions of Others 
The topic of radio frequency identification has recently gained momentum as a topic 
of interest.  In particular, interests as they relate to the issues of privacy, security, and the 
further development of this technology have been addressed via a host of other researchers or 
individuals who have found a fascination with it.  Contributors to the topic as relevant to this 
thesis range from the United States Government to special interest electronic journals and 
newsletters.   
 
Despite the range of contributors, this study particularly relies on: information 
divulged by the organization Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and 
Numbering (CASPIAN); information published by the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) Auto-ID Labs; information collected under the United States Government 
Department of Homeland Security; information on RFID security provided by authors Frank 
Thornton, Brad Haines, Anand M. Das, Hersh Bhargava, Anita Campbell, and John 
Kleinschmidt; the RFID research group of Johns Hopkins University; a collection of survey 
material generated by Christine Perakslis and Robert Wolk of Bridgewater State College; and 
the research group consisting of John Halamka, Ari Jules, Adam Stubblefield, and Jonathan 
Westhues.  It is of worthy note that Mr. Westhues be mentioned individually as he has made 
a major contribution in demonstrating how a tag may be cloned and has even provided 
information regarding how a cloner may be built [13].  
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Each of the groups named above have made some significant contribution to the 
study of the security of RFID and the social implications it may have by citing or exploiting 
the problems the technology has with security or expressing concerns that surround the 
mainstream implementation of the technology.  One group - the research group consisting of 
Halamka, Jules, Stubblefield, and Westhues - has even suggested an alternative type of tag 
that may be used for a particular application of RFID [14].  Although many articles and 
papers relate to the topic of this thesis as suggested by the contributors listed, it is the 
author’s intent to make a contribution that will not only cite the problems of mainstream 
implementation of the technology, but will also provide an alternative means for securing 
read-only passive low-frequency identifying tags that utilize a single identifier.  
 
2.2. Contributions of the Author 
I have taken a particular interest in the subject matter as a result of exposure to a 
particular application of RFID that has the potential to serve as a key to opening Pandora’s 
box – the implantation of RFID transponders in humans.  Although I maintain a strong 
opinion regarding the application, I will refrain from interjecting my personal opinion and 
instead, present the views of others found via a survey distributed to find out information 
about participants’ basic knowledge of RFID and how they regard databases, their privacy 
and security, and the implantation of tags.  While the survey may not be considered 
scientific, it is supplemented by the findings of Perakslis and Wolk [15].   
 
In addition to the social effects of RFID, I understand there is major concern 
surrounding the security of RFID systems and will also explore the feasibility of utilizing the 
concept of fingerprinting tags as based on a technique for fingerprinting network interface 
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cards (NIC) introduced by the Detecting Intrusion at Layer ONe (DILON) research group of 
Iowa State University.  The practicality of this technique will be addressed by what is 
thought to be the first step in the process – detection and characterization of an RF signal 
emitted by passive low frequency tags during tag-to-reader communication.  Finally, I will 
review the pros and cons of fingerprinting RFID transponders.      
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CHAPTER 3: Applications of RFID 
 
 
The use of radio frequency identification in society has become more common than 
one may think.  Although reading basic material on the subject matter presents the idea that 
the technology is limited to supply-chain-management and its anticipated replacement of the 
bar code along with possible future applications, further reading and an understanding of 
what RFID entails will show it currently resides in a vast array of applications.  A few of the 
applications that rely on it include (but are not limited to): 
• Airline Luggage Identifiers 
• Animal Identification 
• Automobiles  
• Credit Cards 
• Electronic Toll Collection 
• Electronic Article Surveillance 
(EAS) 
• Home Access 
• Library Books 
• Medical Alert Devices 
• Passports  
• Proximity/Access Cards 
• Remote Keyless Entry 
• Supply-Chain Management 
 
 
Given these applications are common, it could be assumed that RFID may be easily 
associated with them since they all can identify a specified object or set of objects by 
wireless means.  However, that is not the case.  A survey distributed to 110 individuals 
ranging in age from 18 to 55 asked the participants several questions regarding their basic 
knowledge of radio frequency identification.  Results showed that while 61.82% were aware 
of what RFID is, there was a significant variation in listed applications being correctly 
identified as being or containing RFID.  Table 1 displays applications participants were asked 
to identify along with the resulting percentage of correct responses.  
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Application 
% Correctly 
Associating 
Application with 
RFID 
Animal Identification Systems 81.82% 
Automobile Remote Keyless Entry 68.18% 
Credit Cards 43.64% 
Electronic Toll Collection 78.18% 
Library Books 65.45% 
Luggage Identifiers Printed by Airlines 55.45% 
Medical Alert Devices 71.82% 
Passports 31.82% 
Proximity/Access Card 82.73% 
Table 1 - Percentage of survey participants correctly associating given applications with RFID 
 
 
These results, along with the percentage that were aware of what RFID is, closely 
compares with those results found in [15], which states that “more than 75% of respondents 
indicated that they had used or were aware of services using RFID technology, yet 
respondents did not recognize RFID as the technology utilized in these processes.”  
 
3.1 A Controversial Application 
There are many proposed applications and enhancements for current applications 
being considered, which will eventually culminate in the “Internet of Things” – an ad-hoc 
network established by the arbitrary interaction of RFID tags [1,16].  Applications that are 
proposed, under development, or being prototyped include: 
• Currency 
• Home Appliances 
• Interactive Grocery Store 
• Interactive Smart Homes 
• People 
• Postage Stamps 
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As may be seen, the “Internet of Things” is not limited to inanimate objects and animals, it 
has moved into the realm of use in humans by means of injection.  
 
3.1.1 Why insert?  Advocating injection of transponders into people 
When we begin to look at social issues such as National security, personal identity, 
personal security, transactions, emergencies, and tracking, RFID becomes somewhat of a 
champion for those in distress.   
 
In the wake of the events that transpired in New York City, NY on September 11, 
2001, the United States has attempted to maintain a heightened level of security to ensure 
such an incident never occurs again.  Incorporating RFID into identifying objects, 
documents, and identifiers such as driver’s licenses will help the country keep track of those 
who are deemed “suspicious”.  By asking citizens to comply with this request, theoretically 
we will be able to pinpoint troublemakers more quickly and essentially intercept most 
criminal or terrorist activity.  Even if support from citizens is not solicited, RFID devices 
could be ordered or required to be carried by criminals and those implicated as being 
involved in terrorist activities – essentially allowing a method of “tracking” incendiaries 
without imposing on law-abiding citizens. 
 
In terms of personal identity and security, the benefits of using a transponder come in 
the form of better protection against identity theft.  The key to this is the fundamental 
consolidation of personal information into one device that contains security features, such as 
challenge-response algorithms, currently applied to computer networks and other wireless 
entities.  Since transponders that can be injected or any other type of transponder proposed to 
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be connected to a human typically are passive and operate at low frequency, additional 
security may be found in the short read range of such tags.  Also, given the skin will 
attenuate the signal emitted by the device, the read range will almost certainly be shorter than 
the read range actually advertised. 
 
In the case of emergencies, RFID may be thought of as a life-saving device.  In 
situations where a person arrives at a hospital, cannot identify him or herself, and has no one 
present to aid in identifying him or her, a medical attendant can simply query the transponder 
for the patient’s number and identify him or her by matching the number to his or her file 
which is located in a regional or national database.  In addition, the transponder could be 
configured to operate as a medical alert device.  
 
Finally, for the case of security and access to confidential information, RFID 
transponders can replace keys – eliminating the need to distribute keys and re-key an office 
in the event a person’s access is revoked.  Instead, an access control list (ACL) could be used 
to control who can and cannot enter an area based on the transponder’s identifier.  In an 
office environment, this may fair better than access cards as employees cannot forget to leave 
the transponder at home.  The employer may also save on the cost of replacing damaged 
badges and even the issuance of cards in general.  If employees already have implants, the 
employer could just as easily obtain the employee’s number (with consent) and create an 
association to it via an association table.  The same may be said for the home and 
automobile. 
   
 
 16
One thing that may be of particular concern is the use of a single identifying number 
for multiple applications, which is the equivalent of having one password for all Internet and 
computer access.  However, as mentioned before, the creation of an association table that 
creates a new identifier for a particular application may alleviate concerns of the actual 
number ever being exposed or available for linking to multiple databases.   
 
In summary, injecting transponders into people may help with maintaining National 
security, may help fight identity theft, may be presumed a life-saving device, allow quick 
access and transactions, and can provide better access to private and/or confidential 
information and/or locations.  
 
3.1.2 Why not insert?  Criticizing the injection of transponders into people 
The same reasons for inserting a tag may also be used in an argument against 
inserting tags.  
 
National Security is a major government concern in the post 9/11 era.  However, the 
idea that American citizens will willingly submit to having a tag inserted into them to help 
maintain national security is rather optimistic.  Results from the survey distributed on behalf 
of this thesis indicate that in terms of being most important, national security ranked third 
when compared to personal security, privacy, and religious beliefs. Additionally, outrage 
may ensue if criminals are forced to carry RFID devices; human rights may be viewed as 
violated and question of what will prohibit the government from enforcing this policy on 
law-abiding citizens will arise.  This results in the concern of abuse of power.  [15] cites the 
1997 U.S. Privacy Protection Study Commission as suggesting, “the real danger is the 
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gradual erosion of individual liberties, through the automation, integration, and 
interconnection of many small, separate record keeping systems, each of which alone may 
seem innocuous, even benevolent, and wholly justifiable.”   
 
In the case of using RFID for personal identity and security, placing or associating 
multiple applications to a single number or identifier will place an individual at greater risk 
for sensitive information to be compromised and stolen.  Also, if everything is linked to or 
stored in a single database, a breach of that database would result in the compromise of all 
general information rather than application specific information.  Even though the short read 
range of a transponder and use of cryptographic functions add additional security, there are 
several additional things to consider: 
 
Limitation of Security Features.  The type of security features such as cryptographic 
functions and challenge-response algorithms that may be used (as well as the complexity 
of such functions) will be limited by the size of the transponder and how much memory it 
contains.  This is likely to have a direct correlation to the cost of the chip. 
 
Rogue Reading. Directional high-gain antennas may be used to achieve a larger read 
range from the signal.  Although the type of tag and reader used is not identified, in 2005 
a read range of 69ft was achieved in a competition geared toward exploiting or extending 
the read range of a tag [17].  Even if a specialized antenna does not extend the read range 
it would still only take a stranger bumping into you or even just passing by to have a 
transponder queried by a reader the person may have hidden under clothing or as an 
accessory. 
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In terms of emergencies, while an inserted RFID transponder may be deemed a life-
saving device, heavy consideration should be given to events in which there is a loss of 
power, the database can’t be accessed due to low bandwidth, or the host for the database 
becomes inoperable or is compromised.  These are major problems and concerns that already 
plague systems that have become digitized (not just in the medical realm).  While the 
likelihood such events would take place frequently is low, they are still threats that could 
undermine the advantage RFID is suggested to have.   
 
Finally, for the case of security and access to confidential information, several groups 
have indicated that use of RFID alone for authentication purposes is not reliable.  [18] even 
mentions that alternative solutions for identification should be explored.  The point regarding 
unreliable authentication also lends itself to the issue of using RFID for access control and 
transactions.  Within this category are also issues concerning other forms of manipulation 
such as jamming and hacking as well as physical damage and loss of power.   
 
Overall, RFID may be considered a cure-all for sensitive applications when it is only 
a quick fix.  As technology advances, so does the knowledge and capabilities of people 
looking to undermine specific arenas.  The introduction of RFID in the manner of a person 
playing host for a transponder will only make it easier for criminals and the like to obtain the 
objects of their desire. 
 
3.2 RFID Warfare 
As may be seen by the arguments that have been presented, two major concerns with 
the implementation of any RFID system are privacy and security.  Because of this, no matter 
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what argument is pursued, a great deal of emphasis is placed on securing a system as well 
and as cost efficiently as possible.  Despite this common goal, the arguments presented 
demonstrate that for each reason for or against applying RFID to humans (or any other 
application) the opposing side can present feasible reasoning as to why the view presented by 
the opposition will not work or can be altered in favor of the opposition. This ultimately 
results in a cycle of RFID warfare.   
 
 
Figure 2 - RFID Warfare Cycle presented from a security standpoint. 
 
 
This cycle of warfare, which is illustrated in Figure 2, is an observation we have 
made in reviewing the arguments presented by RFID proponents and opponents. An idea or 
application is presented that offers added privacy and security along with the other benefits 
of using it.  In a matter of time, the security is compromised and measures are eventually 
established to counter the compromise.  Counter-counter measures soon follow, resulting in 
yet another security compromise and ultimately, a repetitive cycle that is only broken by the 
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introduction of another form of technology.    The cycle is then reinstated with the new 
technology.   
 
The RFID Warfare Cycle may be complimented by the technology adoption lifecycle 
represented by Rogers’ Innovation Adoption Curve.   As depicted by [19] and represented in 
Figure 3, the life of technology begins with Innovators, those who want to adopt newer 
technology for the sake of it.  Followed by the Innovators are the Early Adapters, people who 
want to adopt a new technology because they can see a beneficial application for it.  Not 
represented on the curve is the Chasm, a critical stage in the development of technology that 
serves as a phase between the Early Adapters and initial mainstream implementation of the 
technology, the stage applicable to the Early Majority.  The Early Majority, those who are 
ready to find the advantages of the tested technology, leads those considered to be the Late 
Majority – Traditionalists who are reluctant to give into a technology, but eventually do so.   
The final group consists of Traditionalists who are considered to be Laggards – those not 
wanting to accept the technology and question its worth.   
 
 
Figure 3 - Rogers' Innovation Adoption Curve. 
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When viewing the RFID Warfare Cycle and Rogers’ Innovation Adoption Curve as a 
pair, the RFID Warfare Cycle may be viewed as an ongoing battle between Traditionalists 
and those choosing to adopt the technology.   Since it is not guaranteed that a technology will 
pass the Chasm stage, either cycle can cease before reaching mainstream implementation. 
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CHAPTER 4:  Social Implications of RFID 
 
 
RFID technology has established a latent presence in society, as may be inferred by 
the list of some current applications given in Chapter 3.  However, given the RFID warfare 
cycle, the question of its worth in certain applications arises.  Essentially, the core issues 
surrounding RFID that continually arise include: privacy; inconveniences; health risks and 
concerns; and ethical and legal issues.   
 
4.1 Privacy 
The main advantages of using RFID – speed, efficiency, and reliability – are also 
poised to become the crux for disadvantages.  By eliminating the need to have physical 
contact for device communication and replacing it with proximity communication [20], what 
was thought to be private communication has, in some ways, become open communication.  
This may be understood through the following example.  If you are in a room of people and 
only want to communicate information with one person, you may find that person and look 
them face-to-face while speaking to him or her.  However, an open communication system 
may be synonymous with being in that same room of people and yelling across the room to 
the individual you wish to communicate information with, all while in hopes that others in 
the room will continue with their personal conversations and ignore your conversation. 
 
This is the problem that is presented with RFID – essentially broadcasting 
information across a room with hopes that no others are listening.   While transponders are 
limited in range, the fact that information can be relayed in open air versus physical contact 
raises alarms for those interested in maintaining privacy.  Although the survey distributed by 
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the author indicates that 50% of participants view privacy as extremely important, Perakslis 
and Wolk indicate, “…privacy [is a] chief concern in all nations for the usages of RFID, 
Biometrics, and the fused usages of Biometrics with RFID (including implantable chips).” 
 
Before moving any further into this discussion, it is important to define the term 
privacy.  [21] provides a good definition of both privacy and security that will be used in the 
remainder of this document.  Privacy is defined as, “when and with whom you share your 
personal information,” and security is defined as, “how well your information is protected 
from unauthorized access, alteration, or destruction.” 
 
Referring back to the transponder, the authors of [20] performed experiments with 
RFID-enabled credit cards that demonstrated most cards reveal very sensitive information, 
including: the cardholder’s name, the complete credit card number, the credit card expiration 
date, the credit card type, and relevant information about the software version and supported 
protocols.  They were also successful in performing attacks that included skimming, 
eavesdropping, and replay attacks.   
 
In addition to privacy issues raised by RFID-enabled credit cards, concerns have been 
raised regarding the use of RFID in passports.  [22] suggests that in adopting e-passports, the 
United States is following guidelines set forth by the United Nation’s International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO), which maintains that RFID-enabled passports should contain 
the passport holder’s name, date of birth, and passport number in the memory.  This is 
verified in [23], which shows that for the United States, the RFID chip will also contain the 
nationality, sex, place of birth, a digital photograph, passport issue and expiration date, and 
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the type of passport issued.  Although a Faraday cage housing is used to physically protect 
the data when the passport is not in operation and a cryptographic function for passive 
authentication and an optional cryptographic function for active authentication is used when 
it is in operation, the major risk of privacy invasion still occurs when the passport is in use.  
When engaged, [22] reports that among other things, there is a risk of eavesdropping and 
data leakage, which may lead to identity theft, tracking, and hotlisting despite the 
implementation of a cryptographic function.  Additionally, it is noted in [24] that the United 
States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plans to keep data gathered from passport 
readers for 75 years.  If information from all passport readers is piped into a single database, 
another problem will ensue depending on the sensitivity of the information being stored.  The 
issue of using databases in an RFID system is further discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
To understand the privacy implications of using a centralized mainstream RFID 
system, it is necessary to take a look at those implications that occur with currently 
implemented RFID systems.  Viviane Reding, Commissioner of the European Information 
Society & Media, mentioned in [25] that 1 billion RFID-enabled devices exist worldwide and 
that this number is projected to grow 500 times (to 500 billion) within the next 10 years.  At 
this rate of growth, it is necessary to address the privacy issues presented by commonly used 
systems.  Accordingly, DHS’s Data Privacy & Integrity Committee presents the question, 
“… do privacy and security concerns outweigh the incremental benefits gained by using an 
RFID-enabled system over a system poising fewer privacy and security risks? [18]”   
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4.2 Inconveniences 
In understanding the inconveniences that may occur in an RFID system, one may take a 
look at those things that are likely to inhibit the operation of a system.   
 
Transponder Placement.  In the case of human insertion, a person will need to see a 
specialist to have the chip inserted [26].  Because human skin is not as pliable as the skin 
of animals such as cats or dogs, insertion may result in pain and/or damage. Also, there 
exists the likelihood that multiple attempts to insert the transponder correctly will be 
needed.  In the case of other applications where a high accuracy rate coupled with speed 
is desired, such as warehouses and e-toll collection, the placement of the tag is important 
dependent on the type of antenna and labeling used.   
 
Transponder Aging.  Although passive tags do not carry a power supply and are 
advertised as surviving the life of the host, realistically, the components used for creating 
the transponder will experience aging.  At some point in time, this may cause 
degradation in the tag’s acceptance rate.  In the event that a high acceptance rate is 
desired and replacement becomes necessary, the process of removal from a human will 
likely be painful and tedious as the tag can migrate unless a protein coating is used or the 
tag capsule is porous, allowing for skin, etc. to grow into and around it.  In the case of 
the later, removal may be extremely painful if a local anesthetic is not used [26].  
 
Transponder, Reader Operation and Reliability.  There are many circumstances in 
which the tag may not work, the reader may not work, or there is a complete breakdown 
in communication.  [14] reports that, due to manufacturing, tags may experience a 5% 
failure rate.  Other sources of failure include whether or not the system is correctly 
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installed or implemented; malicious activity occurring in the proximity of the system; 
situational events such as power outages, blackouts, brownouts, isolated loss of power to 
the reader (accidental and otherwise); reader settings not appropriate for communication 
with a particular tag; and, unknown and/or unintended damage (physical and otherwise) 
to either apparatus.  In fact, Perakslis and Wolk have found another study to confirm that 
66% of consumers find it worse to have access to a system denied to him or her due to 
glitches than to have a system that does not rely on proving his or her identity. 
 
Compromise Recovery. In the event a system is compromised, “…the thorny question 
arises of how to re-establish access rights for compromised devices. [14]” For example, 
a person is carrying a transponder embedded under his or her skin, and someone clones 
that person’s information.  The clone successfully grants access to the targeted system, 
resulting in a system compromise.  In attempting to re-establish access rights, it would 
not be logical to reuse the identifier that resulted in the compromise and the person who 
was originally granted access may not want to undergo transponder replacement.  This is 
likely why it is not recommended that RFID be used alone for authentication and 
security purposes [14,18].  Special consideration must also be taken if biometrics is also 
used as a supplement for flaws in the system – this will further complicate how the 
problem may be resolved. 
  
Cost of Support.  An argument for RFID is the expected minimal cost for transponders.  
Unfortunately, this low-cost is not extended to readers and databases – the other key 
components of an RFID system.  Although the cost of upkeep will vary by application 
and implementation, it should be safe to say that the reader and database will prove to be 
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the costliest, especially when considering the use of passive tags.  Just as a transponder 
ages, so will a reader.  It will also be necessary to pay for power to the reader and 
database host.  Database upkeep will be contingent on the upkeep of the host for the 
database, be it a desktop computer, the reader itself, a server, or even a mobile telephone 
or personal digital assistant (PDA).  These circumstances should be taken into 
consideration when comparing an RFID-enabled system to its standard counterpart (e.g. 
a lock & key system).   
  
4.3 Health Risks & Concerns 
In the age of the mobile telephone, a particular awareness has been raised about the 
effects of radiation and the effects on health that may result from exposure to radiation.  As a 
result, radio frequency identification, particularly the use of it in humans, may come under 
the same scrutiny as cellular telephones have gone under because of its intended daily use 
and possibly being embedded in the body.   
 
In the survey distributed to find out more about how participants feel about RFID, 
75.45% of respondents suggested they would not opt to have a transponder – one that would 
link them to their medical records, allow them to make financial transactions without pulling 
out a card or checkbook, and allow them access to their car, home, or any other location 
without the use of a key – injected into their hand.  Of those that do not favor insertion, 
15.66% cited medical concerns as prohibiting them from having the chips injected.  Although 
we have moved a step closer to using injected transponders in a centralized identification 
system through the introduction of VeriMed, an RFID system for at-risk medical patients that 
uses the VeriChip transponder [27], there are still concerns relevant to how such devices may 
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affect health if widespread implementation occurs, including: possibility of an allergic 
reaction, the body rejecting the tag, and whether or not the radiation involved with tag-
transponder communication is strong enough to have a negative side effect if continuously 
used over an extended period of time.   
 
These concerns are also addressed in an October 2004 letter CASPIAN found 
addressed from the FDA to the then Vice President of Finance and Chief Financial Office for 
Digital Angel Corporation: 
“The potential risks to health associated with the device are: adverse tissue reaction; migration 
of implanted transponder; compromised information security; failure of implanted transponder; 
failure of inserter; failure of electronic scanner; electromagnetic interference; electrical hazards; 
magnetic resonance imaging incompatibility; and needle stick. The special controls document 
aids in mitigating the risks by identifying performance and safety testing, and appropriate 
labeling. Thus, in addition to the general controls of the act, an Implantable Radiofrequency 
Transponder System for Patient Identification and Health Information is subject to the following 
special control: Class II Special Controls Guidance Document:  Implantable Radiofrequency 
Transponder System for Patient Identification and Health Information.” [28, 29] 
 
Despite this warning, the amount of radiation a person is exposed to when participating in a 
RFID system is thought to be considerably low.  However, it is suggested that future studies 
on the health concerns and issues incorporate what kind of long-term effects may result from 
continuous exposure to low amounts of radiation.   
 
4.4 Ethical & Legal Issues 
Other issues surrounding the use of a centralized RFID system include those relevant 
to ethics and law.  Issues congruent to this matter include (but are not limited to) exclusion 
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based on religious preferences, public knowledge of the technology, and identity theft among 
other crimes.  
 
Unlike newer forms of technology, RFID has brought upon a general concern by 
some as a result of religious beliefs.  Christians have been cited as being one of the major 
opponents to the use of RFID because of a passage from the book of Revelations in the 
Christian Bible: 
“He also forced everyone, small and great, rich and poor, free and slave, to receive a mark on 
his right hand or on his forehead, so that no one could buy or sell unless he had the mark, which 
is the name of the beast or the number of his name.  This calls for wisdom.  If anyone has insight, 
let him calculate the number of the beast, for it is man’s number.  His number is 666.” [30]  
 
If the required use of this electronic ID were to prevail, the posed concern may easily turn 
into fear of exclusion based on such preferences.  
 
In the distributed survey, 18.07% of participants cited religious beliefs as the 
prohibitor for inserting or injecting a chip into themselves.  Although participants were not 
asked to identify their religious preference, according to [31] approximately 32% of the 
world population and 75% of U.S. and Canadian adults have been identified as Christian. 
Assuming all individuals included in the statistics consciously deny the use of RFID, an 
enormous portion of the world population would be excluded!  If RFID were to become a 
standard across the globe, the question of what could be done by this group, and other 
groups, to circumvent exclusion arises.   
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It may be because of this, among many other reasons, laws in the United States have 
emerged that are relevant to the use of RFID.  States that have either introduced or passed 
legislation concerning the technology include:   
• California 
• Maryland 
• Massachusetts 
• Missouri 
• Nevada 
• New Hampshire 
• New Mexico 
• Rhode Island 
• South Dakota 
• Utah 
• Tennessee 
• Texas 
• Wisconsin
 
In addition to the laws offered by these states, there are national laws that have been drafted 
or are in place that either directly or indirectly reference the technology.  On October 25, 
2005, the U.S. Department of State implemented a rule that required all U.S. passports to 
begin transition into an electronic passport containing RFID [23].     
 
While it does not explicitly mention RFID as the technology of choice, the REAL ID 
Act of 2005 alludes to the implementation of RFID in state issued drivers licenses (among 
other forms of electronic identifiers such as magnetic strips) [32].  Originally, the Act was to 
affect all licenses issued before (and after) May 11, 2008.  However, due to state opposition, 
the new deadline has been delayed until 2009 [33].  
 
Another point of legislation is the RFID Right to Know Act of 2003, which was 
drafted by CASPIAN.  This would, if formally introduced and passed, essentially require 
those utilizing RFID to let consumers know about the use or implementation of the 
technology up-front, limit the use of RFID enabled devices, and assert public education of 
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the technology.  Although it apparently has not been ratified, some of the issues it brings 
forth have been adopted in the proposed legislation for the previously listed states.   
 
One of the most important provisions of the drafted Act is public education.  In the 
survey that was administered for support of this thesis, participants were asked to identify 
nine items as either being or containing RFID in addition to being asked whether or not they 
were aware of legislation or proposed legislation regarding RFID.  While results to the 
question regarding identification may be found in Table I of Chapter 4, there is a significant 
variation in the items that were correctly identified.  The results also revealed that 90.91% 
were unaware of current or proposed legislation concerning radio frequency identification.  
To further solidify the importance of public education, [18] emphasizes educating the mass 
about RFID technology as a main point in considering the use of RFID for human identity 
verification. 
 
The question of ethics mainly lies in how an RFID system is implemented, how the 
system is used, and how information is retrieved from the system upon implementation.  It 
appears that most companies and other groups that have begun distribution of an RFID 
system have attempted to do so quietly and without explaining what it is and the 
consequences that may occur from using them. One such situation involves a group of 
children in a Northern California school district who were forced to wear RFID enabled 
badges without parental knowledge or consent [34,35].  Once parents were alerted to this, the 
program was dissolved because of public outrage.  Even if wearing the badge was presented 
as optional, the benefits a student could receive from wearing them could have left the 
perception that they were required as suggested by [36]. 
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Other situations involve trial runs of RFID enabled consumer products. [1,37] 
mentions that Proctor & Gamble ran a trial in association with a Broken Arrow, OK Wal-
Mart store, in which a particular product line contained a hidden RFID transponder.  This 
allowed Proctor & Gamble researchers 750 miles away to know when the product was picked 
up, when inventory was low, and even see an image of customers who were exploring the 
product.   Unfortunately, customers were not informed of this trial and after [36] appeared, 
denials of performing the trial arose until undeniable evidence proved otherwise [1].  In the 
case where implanted tags are perceived as a voluntary action 
 
Cause for concern not only lies with companies and other RFID interest groups, it lies 
with the government and individuals.  Many have a concern about the possible abuse of 
government power that may come with the introduction of any kind of electronic 
identification system - the main concern dealing with possible loss of privacy and eventual 
tracking.  Results from the survey distributed for this thesis show that 84.55% of survey 
participants would be concerned if the government were to mandate implanted RFID tags.  
Of those who would be concerned, 68.82% noted they would attempt to lobby or campaign 
against the mandate.  As an alternative, if the option of carrying rather than implanting the 
tag were presented, 60.91% noted they would be concerned, and of those, 70.15% would 
attempt to lobby or campaign against the mandate. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, one of the main reasons for introducing a centralized 
mainstream RFID system is to help consumers better deal with identity theft.  Unfortunately, 
the security threats presented in Chapter 5 prevent this ideology from being feasible.  As an 
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example, the sensitive information contained on an e-passport could be used to create a 
virtual image of the victim.  Therefore, the introduction of new and tougher legislation only 
solves one part of the equation; the other half deals with the question of how to enforce those 
laws and ensure compromising activity is low.  Unfortunately, this will be tough to deal with, 
as compromising activity may be less likely to be detected given that communication of data 
is airborne.   
 
 
 34
CHAPTER 5:  Security of RFID 
 
 
A quote made by Ari Juels of RSA Labs in [38] reads, “The world of RFID is like the 
Internet in its early stages… Nobody thought about building security features into the 
Internet in advance, and now we’re paying for it in viruses and other attacks.  We’re likely to 
see the same thing with RFIDs.”  This viewpoint summarizes one of the main problems with 
RFID – no development of security features in the early stages.  So, in regards to the issue of 
security, the question therefore becomes, not if, but when will this technology be 
compromised. 
 
5.1 Constraints 
5.1.1 Transponder Size 
Transponders come in a variety of shapes and sizes – some being advertised as small 
as a spec of powder at 50.8μm by 50.8μm [39].  Those transponders referenced in this 
document are thought to be similar in size to those experimentally injected in humans in 
addition to transponders that we measure to be roughly the size of an aspirin.  These small 
sizes tend to prohibit a tag from containing any security measures since the memory is 
constrained by physical limitations.  This is something that may not be an issue in the future 
as new methods of decreasing the physical size of storage (increasing the amount of memory) 
are introduced. 
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5.1.2 RFID System Range 
Naturally, the range of an RFID system plays a large role in the security of that 
system.  According to [40], the constraints affecting the achievable range of an RFID system 
are the radiated field strength and electromagnetics.   
 
[40] summarizes radiated field strength as, “…directly limited by regulations, and 
through regulatory and hardware bandwidth constraints, influenced indirectly by 
communications.”  Regulations for RFID devices are typically limited to government 
regulation by frequency range and standards that may exist for different applications. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction and Chapter 3, tags under consideration are passive 
and low frequency in nature.  In the United States, if an RFID system radiates, it is subject to 
regulation by the FCC.  However, if the system is reliant on mutual inductance, it will not be 
subject to government regulation since it is not a radiator; regulation would only ensue in the 
event a system causes some interference.  For other countries, the issue of interference may 
soon be addressed by the introduction of policy such as the European Licensing Act for 
Inductive Radio Systems, which defines a 49kHz zone between 70kHz and 119kHz that may 
not be used by RFID equipment [41]. 
 
Other standards do exist, but as mentioned, vary by application.  For example, 
EPCglobal is found to hold a standard for electronic product codes (EPC), while the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) holds multiple standards, including one 
for proximity coupling contactless smartcards (ISO 14443) and animal tracking and 
identification (ISO 11784/11785).  Unfortunately, multiple standards may exist for a 
particular application, which leads to the problem of interoperability and numbering. 
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Constraints on the hardware have just as large an effect on the amount of energy 
radiated as the aforementioned constraints.  The configuration of the tag circuit load also has 
an effect on the range because of the varying number of components needed to suit a 
particular application.  For instance, a tag may incorporate functions such as signal 
processing, memory storage, cryptography, and anti-collision techniques while another tag 
may incorporate only signal processing and memory storage.  In either case, power is needed 
to drive the components needed to complete the functions!  If power cannot be provided at 
the desired distance, then either the tag has to be moved closer to the reader or the power or 
antenna gain will need to be increased in order to facilitate the functions provided in the tag 
[7]. 
 
The main determinant of the electromagnetics constraint is whether or not the 
transponder lays in the near or far field of the reader.  The near field is described as the field 
in which the magnetic field resides.  This area starts at the antenna and extends to 
approximately λ/2π, where λ represents the wavelength [7].   Frequencies that operate within 
the near field are generally noted as being less than 30MHz.  While the tag uses coupling 
(capacitive or inductive) to receive power, it is standard practice to use a load modulation 
technique when using a LF or HF passive tag within this field.  Load modulation occurs 
when amplitude modulation is simulated in the transponder by the switching on and off of a 
load resistor near the antenna.  With data controlling the timing of the switching, the 
information is transmitted from the transponder to the reader where demodulation occurs by 
way of a rectifier [40]. 
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Once the λ/2π mark is passed, the electromagnetic field separates from the antenna 
and begins propagating as an electromagnetic wave [7].  This area is known as the far field 
and it is within this field that the use of EM waves (long range) to power tags occurs.  
Standard practice demonstrates that the backscatter modulation technique is used and that 
frequencies operating in this field are typically greater than 30MHz.   However, as previously 
mentioned, this study primarily focuses on passive low-frequency transponders.  Therefore, 
transponders discussed in this study operate in the near field, using load modulation and 
inductive coupling. 
 
5.1.3 Antenna Selection & Orientation 
There are a number of types of antennas used within the tag and reader including:  the 
single dipole and dual dipole antennas for tags, and linear and circular loop antennas for 
readers.  Although other types exist, those mentioned above will serve as the basis for 
discussion.   
 
The type of antenna selected and the orientation of the antenna can have an 
interesting effect on the amount of energy radiated.  The single dipole and other similar linear 
antennas can provide modest directionality of coverage, while the dual dipole and circular 
loop antennas provide more of an omni-directional coverage.   An example of the effect 
orientation has may be found in the illustrations given in [42], which show that a single 
dipole antenna chosen for a tag and placed parallel to a linear antenna chosen for the reader 
will receive good coverage, while the same tag’s antenna placed perpendicular to the reader 
antenna will not – a concept defined as polarization mismatch.  However, using the same tag 
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with a circular loop antenna chosen for the reader will provide good coverage in either 
orientation.  
 
5.2 Threats to RFID Security 
So far, the size and range of a transponder have been identified as points of threats to 
the security of an RFID system.  However, there are numerous other threats, some which 
have yet to be identified.  With the help of information provided in [43] and additional 
observations, we have categorized a list of known threats to an RFID system, which is shown 
in Table 3 by the point at which they occur.   
 
Point Threat 
Tag • Blocking 
• Physical Damage 
• Range 
• Size 
Airlink • Denial of Service (DoS) 
• Replay 
• Spoofing 
Reader • Impersonation (Rogue Reader) 
• Malicious Code 
• Physical Damage 
Database  • Hacking 
• Human/Software Error 
• Malicious Code 
• Physical Damage 
• Theft  
Table 2 - Security Threats of an RFID System by Point of Threat 
 
5.2.1 Tag Threats 
As mentioned in [43], one of the attacks that can occur against an RFID system is 
actually blocking a tag from a reader.  It is widely known that by placing a strip of aluminum 
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foil – or a thin strip of foil enveloping a thin layer of salt-water solution – over a tag, the tag 
can be blocked from sending or receiving a signal.  This type of attack would more 
specifically affect store merchandise as it may now become more susceptible to petty theft. 
 
Additionally, the transponder is also susceptible to physical damage.  A tag may be 
disabled or destroyed in a microwave oven in as little as two to three seconds [1]. Tampering 
with or destroying the circuit and/or antenna may also destroy it.  In all cases, damage to the 
tag will result in it no longer being operable and thus undetectable.  Again, such actions are 
particularly relevant in the case of store merchandise containing a transponder. 
 
5.2.2 Airlink Threats 
Between the transponder and the reader lies the airlink.  This area is probably the 
second most vulnerable spot in an RFID system, as the information flow cannot be physically 
protected. Threats to the security of an RFID system at this point fall as prey to attacks that 
occur to many other wireless systems and computer networks.  One such attack is the Denial-
of-Service (DoS) attack.   
 
A DoS attack may occur when too many tags are placed near a reader, especially 
when the reader does not employ anti-collision measures.  So, from the perspective of a 
reader, simply placing two or more transponders in the reader’s field will jam the airlink.  
Similar attacks may occur by using an unrelated device such as a frequency generator to 
create enough signal noise to cloud or cancel the desired signal.  Other DoS attacks may 
occur in the form of physically altering the surrounding environment to increase the 
likelihood of multipath and fading, which could essentially cancel the desired signal 
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altogether.  Physical alteration of the system may also lead to DoS in cases where power to 
and from the reader is cut or eliminated. 
 
Spoofing is also a likely threat.  Instead of waiting to record or clone a tag, a 
determined person may attempt a brute force attack or use a pre-computed identifier.  Likely 
combinations of characters may be pre-computed if the number of bits used as well as the 
format of the identifier is known (e.g. 10 hexadecimal characters).  [1] identifies a chart 
containing information from the MIT Auto-ID center that pinpoints the number of bits 
needed to uniquely identify items in a particular group. 
 
5.2.3 Reader Threats 
The use of malicious code may come as a surprise in an RFID system given the 
constraints placed on the technology (particularly the transponder).  This is further intensified 
when considering the use of a passive read-only transponder.  There is already a documented 
case in which a virus was maliciously loaded onto a tag for purposes of affecting the database 
[44].  In this case, simply presenting the tag to the reader may shut down an entire system by 
way of a malicious transponder.  Although that case applied to an UHF tag, there is no 
implied limitation.  A tag can be loaded with a destructive system command and set to 
operate at the frequency of the target reader [43].  
 
Although the short read range of a transponder is a critical point in securing the front-
end of the system, it may still be lengthened by the use of a directional high-gain antenna.  
Such antennas may be used to eavesdrop on communication between a tag and reader.  After 
successfully recording the signal emitted by the reader, assuming a challenge-response 
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algorithm is not used, the signal may be replayed via a clone.  Such activity may also occur 
without the use of a directional antenna.  In this case, a rogue reader that may be hidden and 
used within close proximity of the target system can be used to aid in cloning as done by 
Jonathan Westhues [13].   
 
Unless more than one reader is used for a particular application, physical damage to a 
reader could take out an entire system. 
 
5.2.4 Database Threats 
While the transponder and reader are major components of an RFID system, the 
database is just as critical.  In most cases, while the tag holds a single identifying number, 
there has to be an entity that relates the key information specifically to that number.  That is 
where the database comes in – linking the identifier to specific information.  While this link 
is vital to the operation of an RFID system, it is also the weakest.   
 
In the survey distributed as a part of this study, participants were asked how secure 
they feel databases are, resulting in 39.09% suggesting they feel databases are secure with a 
close 38.18% suggesting they feel databases are somewhat secure.  This indicates that there 
is obviously a problem with the security of databases – and rightfully so! 
Security of a Database 
(Rank) 
%  
Extremely Secure 1.82% 
Very Secure 13.64%
Secure 39.09%
Somewhat Secure 38.18%
Not Secure 5.45% 
No Response  1.82% 
Table 3 – Survey of participants’ thoughts on database security 
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According to [45], there have been approximately 495 documented cases of database 
breaches between January 10, 2005 and February 19, 2007, affecting in excess of 
104,067,495 data records, including: 
 
• February 15, 2005 breach of a ChoicePoint database in Alpharetta, GA, in which 
identity thieves created fraudulent accounts. 
 
• December 25, 2005 breach of an Iowa State University database attributed to hacking 
that affected approximately 5,500 records comprised of credit card and social security 
numbers (SSN). 
 
• March 14, 2006 breach of a General Motors database in Detroit, MI, in which an 
employee kept the SSNs of co-workers for the purpose of identity theft. 
 
• May 3, 2006 breach of the U.S. Department of Veteran’s Affairs in Washington, D.C. 
in which a laptop containing vital personal information such as SSNs and addresses of 
veterans discharged since 1975 was stolen from an employee’s home, affecting 
approximately 28,600,000 records. 
 
• February 2, 2007 breach of an U.S. Department of Veteran’s Affairs, VA Medical 
Center database in Birmingham, AL in which an employee noted a missing or stolen 
hard drive, affecting 535,000 records. 
 
• February 14, 2007 breach of an Iowa Department of Education database in which a 
hacker was able to view the files of 600 GED recipients.   
 
Unfortunately, it does not appear as if the rate of database breaches is slowing down 
as there has been an increase from four documented breaches during the period of January 10 
to February 19 in 2005 to 47 documented breaches in the same time period in 2007.  [45] 
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also provides an analysis of 2006 breaches, which attributes violations to outside hackers, 
insider malfeasance, human or software incompetence, non-laptop theft, and laptop theft.   
 
This is important knowledge because a centralized mainstream RFID system would 
likely associate an identifying number to information relevant to financial records, medical 
records, classified or general access, or all of the above.  [45] also provides in their analysis 
of 2006 database breaches, a breakdown of how each attributed violation affected a particular 
group:  private sector, public sector, higher education, and medical centers.   Based on the 
likely associations generated in a mainstream system, relevant groups would include the 
private sector, public sector, and medical centers.  Of these, 40% of breaches in the private 
sector were associated with laptop theft, 44% in the public sector were associated with 
human/software incompetence, and 40% in medical centers were associated with laptop theft.  
So, simply put, while databases that are likely to be used in an RFID system may be 
advertised as being secure, they will still be vulnerable to the increasing number of threats 
currently affecting other database applications.  
 
These threats loom further when considering how and if such databases are linked 
together.  A 1989 amendment to the Privacy Act of 1974 (Section 9) states: 
“Nothing in the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to authorize-- 
(1) the establishment or maintenance by any agency of a national data bank that combines, 
merges, or links information on individuals maintained in systems of records by other Federal 
agencies; 
 
(2) the direct linking of computerized systems of records maintained by Federal agencies; 
(3) the computer matching of records not otherwise authorized by law; or 
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(4) the disclosure of records for computer matching except to a Federal, State, or local agency.”  
[46] 
 
However, it does not particularly limit those in non-government sectors of data collection 
from linking records, except by existing laws.  This means that unless prohibited by law, 
private organizations can link information between databases.  Survey participants generally 
believe this is already being done as 80% of them responded that they believe databases are 
currently linked and 54.55% indicated they believe a large central database already exists! 
 
Although 79% of participants disapprove of information about them being contained 
in one database being linked to other databases containing information about them, and 
85.45% indicated they would be concerned if information on them from varying databases 
were consolidated into a large central database, it is likely that the introduction of a 
mainstream RFID system would do this.  This concern is not limited only to survey 
participants.  An August 16, 2005 testimony given by Pam Dixon, then Executive Director of 
World Privacy Forum, before the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics 
(NCVHS) Subcommittee on Privacy and Confidentiality mentioned:  
“Medical identity theft unfortunately may lead to the alteration of medical files… 
Digitization may in fact serve to exacerbate this problem, not solve it, particularly in the 
case of records that are networked.” [47] 
 
 
Given the information that has been presented, it is thereby concluded that a 
centralized mainstream RFID system will serve as a catalyst to linking databases (if not 
already done) that will result in an increased threat of compromising data due to the 
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increased rate of database breaches that is currently observed.  Until databases in general 
receive better security protocols, they will continue to be a major weak link in RFID systems. 
 
5.3 Current Countermeasures & Counter-countermeasures 
5.3.1 Blocker Tags 
The concept of blocking tags may also be used to secure a tag from rogue readers.  
However, the tag that has been proposed for purposes of security is more sophisticated than 
the method of blocking presented as a threat.  In essence, the blocker tag functions under the 
auspices of DoS by jamming the reader; it exploits the tree-walking algorithm used by some 
readers for anti-collision purposes.  It also inadvertently exploits the fact that in using this 
particular algorithm, readers can only read one tag at a time.  (With the proper response from 
a tag, a reader can read the projected hundreds of tags per second.)  When placed in the 
presence of a reader, the blocker tag effectively confuses the reader by sending out differing 
serial numbers, forcing it to walk every branch of the tree.  An illustration of this algorithm 
may be found in Appendix B.   
 
A problem with applying this technique to a tag implanted in a human is the fact that 
if the tag were implanted in a person, to be certain the tag is effective, a person may have to 
wear the blocker tag as if it were a band-aid or “hand-band” (although it may be possible for 
the person to wear it anywhere else on his or her person).  If worn in either of these fashions, 
there is the possibility that it could either fall off or interfere with work and other activities.  
Additionally, consider the use of a blocker tag with such applications as credit cards and 
passports.  While this may protect information in transit, once the card (or other transponder) 
 
 46
is removed from the blocker tag to complete a transaction, it becomes vulnerable to attacks 
mentioned in section 5.3.  
5.3.2 Cryptography 
An obvious choice for securing data in an RFID system is the use of cryptography, 
either by way of encryption or some type of algorithm such as a challenge-response 
algorithm or public-key cryptography algorithm.  While this is probably one of the best 
alternatives, implementation in RFID does have its flaws.  In all cases, the physical size of a 
transponder will limit its memory and computing power.  For now, this means that proven 
algorithms such as the RSA algorithm cannot be used.  [43] mentions that current 
implementation of this option has been left to techniques incorporating relatively weak 
passwords.  As an example, [43] cites the Mobil Speedpass utilizing a challenge-response 
algorithm that incorporated use of a 40-bit key.  Although this carried on successfully for 
seven years before notice, this does raise concern given the nature of communication.  This 
also causes several other concerns: the use of a method known as security-through-obscurity. 
 
Security-through-obscurity is known as being a system’s own worst enemy; 
preventing an outsider from having the opportunity to review the technique used could (and 
usually) result in the exploitation of undetected flaws.  Despite this, many have taken to 
securing algorithms under terms of propriety rather than using an open protocol that has been 
tested rigorously.   
 
5.3.3 Directional Antennas 
The use of directional antennas for the tag and reader could aid in keeping data from 
straying too far away from the intended source and into unchartered territory.  While this 
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may be desirable as an additional aid for securing sensitive information, several factors 
would prevent it from being close to ideal.  Tag orientation would play a huge role in the 
acceptance rate of a system; this may be less suitable for daily applications as it is likely to 
cut down on the speed promised and desired by most systems.  Ultimately, the tag would 
have to have a clear line-of-sight (LOS) with the reader for an acceptable read.  LOS in an 
RFID system is typically less desirable since it may render the system comparable to some 
other systems it is proposed to replace. 
 
5.3.4 Exploiting SNR 
In this method, it is suggested that, “the signal-to-noise ratio of a reader query, as 
measured on an RFID tag, gives a rough indication of how close the tag is to the reader” [8].  
A closer look at this concept reveals the strength of a signal varies as it propagates through 
the transmission medium while the noise typically remains constant; something that may be 
analyzed to determine the distance.  So, in essence, if a tag were able to estimate the distance 
to the reader interrogating it, the tag could be programmed to not respond to a reader unless it 
is within a certain range [8].   
 
The authors of [48] found that, “a minor variation on signal strength analysis does 
correlate tag distance to received energy.”  This roughly equates to the idea being extremely 
feasible. Although the equipment used in the experiments operated at 915 MHz, it may be 
possible to adapt such a technique for lower frequencies.  However, there is only one 
problem: if this technique is used alone, a transponder will transmit data to a rogue reader 
placed within an acceptable range! 
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5.3.5 Kill Command 
The kill command has been introduced primarily for use in transactions involving 
tagged merchandise.  The way this technique works is that once scanned, a password can be 
used to set the kill bit, which would prevent the tag from sending information if ever 
interrogated again.  Unfortunately, as mentioned by [8], one drawback of the kill command is 
that once the tag has been “killed”, there may be question as to whether or not it is still 
“alive”, and if it really is killed, the process cannot be reversed.  Even if it could be reversed, 
one should be concerned as to who can reverse it.  
 
5.3.6 Physical Protection 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Section 1.1, a form of protecting passports incorporates 
the use of a Faraday cage housing.  Of course this may be used with other forms of 
transponders and may be replaced by mu-metal or the alternative method of aluminum foil 
enveloping a thin layer of salt-water solution.  While any of these may be used to enclose a 
transponder or line objects such as wallets, purses, and maybe one day clothing, the problem 
arises when the tag needs to be used.  Removal from the source of protection would render 
the tag (and system) vulnerable for the duration of a transaction or as long as it is removed 
from the protective enclosure.   
 
5.3.7 Soft Blocking 
Soft blocking is a technique in which a program in the reader determines if it is okay 
to read a tag based on a privacy number received from the transponder.  The problem with 
this technique is that a trust with the RFID reader needs to be established and cooperation 
from the reader is required [8].  Without trust and cooperation, the technique would be null 
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and void.  So, in the case of a rogue reader, this would not work, as the transponder has no 
way of protecting itself.   
 
5.3.8 Tag Pseudonyms 
The concept behind tag pseudonyms is that a transponder may hold a specified 
amount of ID numbers.  Each time a person uses his or her transponder a new identification 
number is used.  Problems with this approach include having to register all numbers in a tag 
with each location a person may choose to use his or her transponder.  Also, if someone 
wanted to “take a person’s identity,” or steal products from a store, they would only need 
either one of the numbers (since they would all be registered) or they could continually 
interrogate the transponder until all numbers are found [8].   
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CHAPTER 6:  An Innovative Method for Securing RFID Systems 
 
 
One of the primary concerns of RFID systems is security.  As discussed earlier, 
current security protocols for such systems are limited by the size and range of the 
transponder.  For example, passive low-frequency transponders with a single identifying 
number that are constrained to a small size will not be able to hold a significant amount of 
memory, which in turn limits the complexity of any security protocol implemented.  In 
addition, cost plays a major factor as the centralized mainstream implementation of RFID 
hinges on affordability – adding additional memory and functions without increasing the size 
of a transponder will effectively increase the cost and may, in some cases, eliminate the 
affordability factor or seriously compromise or dampen it.   
 
Because mainstream RFID would incorporate applications that deal with medical and 
financial records and access control, it is imperative that security be designed at the forefront 
rather than introduced later.  However, since that point has all but vanished, the next best 
thing is to look at how an RFID system can secure itself.  A method of doing so surrounds 
the concept of fingerprinting an electronically produced signal. 
 
6.1  RFID Fingerprinting 
 
An on-going project at Iowa State University, the DILON project, presents a unique 
approach for fingerprinting electronically produced signals.  This group believes that the 
components used in manufacturing electronic devices have minute variations because of 
imperfections in their construction [49].  Exploiting these variations can result in the 
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characterization of a signal emitted from a device, thus resulting in a fingerprint for the 
device.  The group was quite successful in experiments performed using wired network 
cards; and, accordingly, the fingerprinting technique used for DILON has been identified as a 
technique that may be adapted for wireless communications and, ultimately, RFID systems. 
 
In brief, the method described in [49] involves the observation and collection of 
signal data from several NICs produced by a single manufacturer and several NICs produced 
by alternative manufacturers, all operating under 10Mb Ethernet.  Once the data is collected, 
a profile of the card is generated and a matched filter is used to distinguish between profiles.  
This methodology resulted in a favorable false reject rate (FRR), less than 1%, for devices 
from differing manufacturers.   
 
In adopting this methodology for RFID, the matched filter may be used to distinguish 
between signals as done in the procedures for DILON.  However, it may also be substituted 
with observing variations in the characteristic signal peaks found in the Fast Fourier 
Transform (FFT) of a signal.  Due to time constraints, verification of this technique is left for 
future work.  Instead, research is refocused to perform signal detection and characterization.  
Successful detection and characterization of a signal will lead to further confidence that the 
DILON technique may be applied to inductively coupled RFID systems. 
 
6.1.1 Signal Detection and Characterization 
For purposes of this study, signal detection involves successfully capturing and 
demodulating data transferred from the tag to the reader.  Detection of data transmitted from 
the reader to the tag is not necessary since the premise of RFID fingerprinting is 
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distinguishing between transponders.  Signal characterization involves successfully decoding 
the demodulated data to reveal the ID transmitted by a tag. 
 
6.1.1.1  Signal Detection 
The equipment used for signal detection included an oscilloscope, two inductors, an 
RFID reader, and two types of RFID tags.  More specific information about the equipment is 
given in Table 4.   
 
Equipment  Information 
Inductance Coil • 88 turns of 30 gauge magnet wire 
• Height: 3.49cm 
• Diameter: 17.78cm 
• Core: Cardboard 
Oscilloscope Tektronix Model DPO 4032  
Digital Phosphor Oscilloscope  
Reader • RFID, Inc. Model 7000E-RO 
• Operating frequency: 125kHz 
Tags • RFID, Inc. Model 1775 Glass Ampoule Tag 
• Read only 
• Operating frequency: 125kHz 
• ID: 10 hexadecimal characters 
• Read time: 12ms to 50ms 
• RFID, Inc. Model 1778 Pill Tag 
• Read only 
• Operating frequency: 125kHz 
• ID: 10 hexadecimal characters 
• Read time: 12ms to 50ms 
Table 4 - List of equipment and specifications used during study. 
 
 
Since the system we are using is an inductively coupled system, a user (or intruder) 
will have to use inductance to detect communication between a tag and reader.  Accordingly, 
the first experiment performed in this study is aimed at determining the maximum distance at 
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which the powered reader can be detected.  This is important from a security standpoint 
because it gives an approximation of how far away someone (authorized or unauthorized) 
will need to be to detect a signal.  
 
To determine the maximum distance at which the reader can be detected, one inductor 
is connected to the oscilloscope and the reader is powered.  As shown in Figure 4, the 
observed maximum voltage level occurs when the reader is placed directly on top of the 
inductor (a distance of 0cm).  From that point, the signal appears to fade exponentially.   
 
 
Figure 4 - Plot of observed voltage levels of a powered reader in relation to distance. 
 
 
Next, the center frequency of the RFID system is verified.  This must be done to 
ensure work from this point forward incorporates the correct center frequency.  Again, one 
inductor is connected to the oscilloscope while the powered reader is placed atop the 
inductor.  Given the equipment is advertised to operate at 125kHz, a sampling rate of 500kHz 
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is selected and a record is taken.  A Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) of the collected data, as 
illustrated in Figure 5, shows that the center frequency of the reader is actually 128kHz.  The 
same procedure is repeated with the two forms of tags selected for this study being separately 
placed atop the reader.  This also yields a center frequency of 128kHz.  
 
Figure 5 - Center frequency verification of reader. 
 
 
In the final experiment, two inductors are attached to opposing ends of a cylinder 
with a height of 17.78cm and diameter of 16.83cm, creating a distance of 10.79cm between 
the inductors.  The inductors are positioned such that, when facing each other, the coils 
appear to be wound in opposite directions.  The two meeting ends of wire are tied together; 
and, when connected to the oscilloscope, are connected to the ground of the probe along with 
one of the free ends of coil.  This setup is constructed to limit the amount of noise detected in 
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the lab environment by a single coil. The reader is then placed atop the top inductor as shown 
in Figure 6.   
 
 
 
Figure 6 - Inductor setup with reader sitting on top coil. 
 
 
Since finding the system actually operates at 128kHz, a new sampling rate of 2.5MHz 
is arbitrarily selected for oversampling, which provides a higher signal resolution than 
sampling at the Nyquist rate, fs = 2fc.   When powered by the reader antenna, the tags 
continuously transmit data; so, data records are taken while a tag sits on top of the reader. 
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As shown in Table 4, the tag read time falls between 12ms and 50ms. To ensure a full 
data frame is recorded, records that are 400ms long are captured.  A segment of a sample 
record is shown in Figure 7.   
 
 
Figure 7 – 5ms segment of a 400ms data record. 
 
 
To verify data has been captured, records are passed through an envelope detector, 
phase detector, and frequency detector – each of which is constructed in MATLAB.  Given 
the nature of this system, AM modulation is expected; and, passing a record through an 
envelope detector should yield a demodulated signal.  The phase detector and frequency 
detector are used to verify there is no phase or frequency modulation.  The code used for 
constructing these detectors is given in Appendix C.  Implementing this step indeed reveals 
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data that is amplitude modulated with no phase or frequency modulation as demonstrated in 
Figure 8. 
 
 
      (a) (b) 
      (c) (d) 
Figure 8 – 48ms clip of a 400ms record displaying output from (a) envelope detector,  
(b) average of envelope detector, (c) phase detector, and (d) instantaneous frequency 
detection.  
 
 
6.1.1.2 Signal Characterization 
Now that signal detection is complete, the arduous task of characterizing the signal 
begins.  To help better understand the demodulated signal, the Signum function is applied to 
the data using the MATLAB sign() function.  This produces the image shown in Figure 9b.   
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       (a) 
 
 
 
      (b) 
Figure 9 – (a) Plot of demodulated data before applying signum function.  (b) Plot of 
demodulated data after applying the signum function. 
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As mentioned in the Introduction, there are a number of baseband coding techniques 
that may be used, including: NRZ, Manchester, Unipolar RZ, DBP, Miller, Differential, and 
PPC.  Initially, several coding techniques are considered as candidates for the technique 
incorporated by our tags, among them Manchester Code and Differential Manchester Code.  
As suggested by [41], Manchester code is used for tag to reader communication in systems 
using load modulation with a sub-carrier.  Reviewing the demodulated data also shows there 
is a noticeable similarity to Differential Manchester Code.  Therefore, in order to decode the 
signal, the data is compared to both techniques.         
 
 In Manchester coding, a binary stream is coded by representing a ‘1’ by a negative 
transition halfway into a bit period, and a ‘0’ is represented by a positive transition halfway 
into a bit period.  Observation of Figure 9b shows that the bit period is approximately 0.3ms, 
which lends to a read time of 24ms.   For this example, the ID emitted from a pill tag is 
0x010444A39C.  Using Manchester coding, the expected sequence is that of Figure 10.   
 
 In Differential Manchester coding, a binary stream is coded by generating a symbolic 
‘1’ such that the first half of the bit period maintains the last half of the previous bit period; 
and, a ‘0’ is generated such that the first half of the bit period is the inverse of the last half of 
the previous bit period.  Figure 11 displays the expected waveform for the ID 
0x010444A39C.   
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Figure 10 - Expected sequence when using Manchester encoding to encode 0x010444A39C.   
The first represented bit is ‘1’, which is an assumed lock bit. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Expected sequence when using Differential Manchester encoding to encode 
0x010444A39C.  The first represented bit is '1', which is an assumed lock bit. 
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 In communications systems, it is expected that communication of information occurs 
in frames consisting of a start sequence followed by the data (in this case, the tag ID number) 
and a stop sequence. Manufacturer information reveals that a lock bit is included; so, it is 
assumed that this bit is also transmitted.  Since additional information that would help reveal 
the frame sequence is not known, the data is visually checked for duplication, as well as used 
for hard bit detection.  It is found that duplication occurs every 32ms.  Therefore, it is 
expected that the read time for the system under testing is 32ms.   
 
 Three methods for hard bit detection are used in this phase of experimental work.  
The first method involves visually applying the rules for the aforementioned line coding 
techniques to decode the data and comparing the decoded bits to the expected bits.  In 
addition to using the rules for those coding techniques with this method, the 32ms time 
period is utilized to estimate a bit period based on the communication of 41 bits.   This 
produces a pattern in which a ‘1’ could be represented as a positive or negative transition 
halfway into a bit period; and, a ‘0’ could be represented as a single positive or negative 
pulse in a bit period. Unfortunately, use of this technique, referred to as Special Case, does 
not produce the expected bit pattern, even when inverted. 
 
Another method used for hard bit detection involves recording the transitions from a 
16ms segment of demodulated data, decoding those transitions, and comparing them with the 
expected bit sequence.  Results from this technique may be seen in Table 5.  While no exact 
match to the expected bit sequence is found, a dominant bit sequence is observed as the 
decoded sequence found after applying the rules for differential Manchester, Pulse-Width 
Modulation (PWM), DBP, and Inverted Biphase Mark Code (BMC) appear to be identical.   
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Tag ID Number:  
0x010444A39C 
Expected Bit Sequence:  
0000 0001 0000 0100 0100 0100 1010 0011 1001 1100 
Observed Signal Transitions: 
0010 1011 0010 1100 1101 0101 0101 0101 0100 1010 1010 1010 1011 0100 1010 101 
Encoding 
Technique Decoded Information 
Biphase Mark  
    Code (BMC) 0110 0100 0111 1111 1011 1111 1010 111x 
Inverted BMC 1001 1011 1000 0000 0100 0000 0101 000x 
DBP 1001 1011 1000 0000 0100 0000 0101 000x 
Differential 1011 1110 1011 1010 1011 1111 1111 1111 1110 1111 1111 1111 
1110 1110 1111 111x 
Inverted  
    Differential 
0100 0001 0100 0101 0100 0000 0000 0000 0001 0000 0000 0000 
0001 0001 0000 000x 
Differential  
   Manchester 1001 1011 1000 0000 0100 0000 0101 000x 
Manchester  1110 1101 0000 0000 0111 1111 1001 111x 
Inverted 
Manchester 0001 0010 1111 1111 1000 0000 0110 000x 
Miller Code Ruled out because of ‘10’ states.  This does not fit the behavior 
defined for this technique. 
Modified Miller   
    Code 
Ruled out because of ‘00’ states.  This does not fit the behavior 
defined for this technique. 
NRZ 0010 1011 0010 1100 1101 0101 0101 0101 0100 1010 1010 1010 
1011 0100 1010 101x 
PWM 1001 1011 1000 0000 0100 0000 0101 000x 
Special Case 1011 1111 0011 0001 1000 
Unipolar RZ Ruled out because of ‘11’ states.  This does not fit the behavior 
defined for this technique. 
Table 5 - Encoding techniques used to decode a 16ms segment of demodulated data with the observed 
transitions. The results from applying the rules for each technique are given in the column, Decoded 
Information.  
 
 
The final method used for hard bit detection consists of: generating the expected bits 
for several line coding schemes in MATLAB based on an estimated bit period of 0.3ms (the 
width of the smallest significant pulse); printing the generated image as well as the image for 
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the demodulated data; and, sliding the expected image across the data image to visually 
locate a match. This method rules out Manchester, Inverted Manchester, and NRZ as the line 
coding schemes used to encode the data.  Although a complete match is not found using 
differential Manchester, portions of the images do match.   
 
6.2 Future Work 
Unfortunately, the methods used for hard bit detection did not produce an exact match 
to the expected bit sequence.  However, there are several factors that should be taken into 
consideration.  In implementing the methods discussed in Section 6.1.1.2, it was assumed 
that the most significant bit is communicated first and that no techniques such as bit stuffing 
or using a password to encrypt the ID before it is loaded onto the tag are used.  Additional 
work may incorporate the assumption that the least significant bit is transmitted first and/or 
the other aforementioned techniques are used.   
 
In the process of demodulating the signal, it was found that there is a low percentage 
of modulation.  Despite this, there is optimism that the DILON technique can be used for 
fingerprinting signals in inductively coupled RFID systems.  Therefore, pending successful 
completion of signal characterization, much work will need to be done to achieve a tag 
fingerprint.  As mentioned in Section 6.1, either the matched filter technique currently used 
for DILON will need to be incorporated, or the characteristic signal peaks found in the FFT 
of signals from various tags will need to be analyzed, to detect signal variation.  If variation 
is observed then the concept of fingerprinting an RFID device is deemed plausible and steps 
can be made to begin profiling tag signals.  
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There are pros and cons to moving forward with further exploration of this technique.  
As mentioned in the opening of this chapter, other countermeasures are faced with the 
obstacle of actually securing the tag rather than bestowing this responsibility exclusively on 
the reader.  Unfortunately, RFID fingerprinting runs into this same problem as tag variability, 
and subsequent fingerprinting, would be determined by the reader.  Where this technique 
differs from most is that no additional cost is forged onto transponders because of reliance on 
the tag’s physical characteristics.  Implementation may therefore be limited to a means by 
which to extract signal data from the reader and an additional “attachment” to the identifier 
in the system database.  Moving forward with further exploration of this technique would 
therefore incorporate an analysis of the expected cost of implementation.  
 
Other benefits this technique would celebrate include the expected ability to 
distinguish between a clone and the real tag – an advantage for the consumer in terms of the 
locations he or she may frequent.  This means that a person may be less susceptible to having 
his or her identity stolen and used in a location he or she frequents.  If the location happens to 
be an office satellite or national chain (e.g. stores and banks), it may even be possible for the 
fingerprint to become applicable at other locations.  However, the downside of this technique 
is experienced when a successful clone is made and used at a location or institution that the 
consumer has never visited.  A profile could be successfully made and utilized without the 
original user’s knowledge.  
 
Another disadvantage is the fact that fingerprinting may be used to track an 
individual, or at least, pinpoint the locations he or she may have visited.  While fingerprinting 
alone would not specify the time and date a person has been to a location, this does allow the 
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ability to generalize a person’s habits.  This may also turn into an advantage since it could be 
used to fight or inhibit the ability of a clone being used to generate a profile without the 
original user’s knowledge or consent.  If a national network of “fingerprints” that keeps track 
of when and where new profiles are generated were to be established, it could be set to 
immediately alert an individual when a new profile is created and ask the person whose 
information is on file to authorize the new profile! 
 
RFID fingerprinting should not be used alone.  In fact, it should only serve to enhance 
the security of a system.  For example, a credit card may be kept in a faraday cage housing or 
mu-metal lined wallet or pocketbook.  Cryptographic measures should also be used to 
maintain data integrity, while RFID fingerprinting in conjunction with exploiting signal SNR 
may be used for verification.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 66
CHAPTER 7:  Conclusion 
 
 
Radio frequency identification is a technology poised to become widely used in the 
future.  Although there is a major reluctance to accept the technology among many people 
because of privacy and security issues, a group of advocates are forcefully pushing for 
further mainstream implementation.  This has given rise to the question posed in the 
introduction of this thesis: how can successful use of this technology coexist with fears and 
concerns of privacy invasion and security risks?    
 
The only way there can be coexistence is by gaining the confidence and trust of those 
people who are questioning the validity of the technology and showing them that it is secure 
and can maintain privacy [8].  One of the best ways to do this is to explore those problems 
that currently exist with the technology then propose ways to correct those problems.  My 
hope is that by tackling the issue of security and social implications of radio frequency 
identification, problems that may occur with introducing this technology as a mainstream 
centralized system for identification are noticed and further action is taken to correct them.   
 
RFID is still at a stage where it may not be too late to consider implementing strong 
security and privacy measures at the very critical design stage.  This is most crucial when 
considering the concept of the, “Internet of Things.”  Modern day computer networks have 
numerous complications, some (not all) of which have been given in Chapter 5 as problems 
RFID is beginning to face – problems that were not perceived as threats with its introduction.  
Building a concept based off of an already ailing system will only result in future unwanted 
complications.  While countermeasures have been given that could help bypass those issues 
 
 67
that RFID has encountered, it has been shown that those countermeasures can become the 
seed for counter-countermeasures, a process that will eventually result in an RFID warfare 
cycle.  While this cycle is inevitable, considering additional creative ways of securing a 
system will only help to strengthen the current level of security.  That is why RFID 
fingerprinting is proposed. 
 
The concept of RFID fingerprinting has been introduced as a technique for enhancing 
current security measures.  It relies on the physical characteristics of the transponder and the 
management of a signal profile created in relation to signals transmitted by the tag and 
received by the reader.  While the concept theoretically sounds feasible, experiments were 
performed to determine feasibility as related to signal detection and characterization.   
 
It has been shown that the signal resulting from communication between a passive tag 
and a reader can be successfully detected.  However, signal characterization is currently 
inconclusive.  In attempting to decode demodulated data, several possible factors were not 
considered, including:  communication of the least significant bit first, bit stuffing, and data 
encryption.  Despite this, we remain optimistic that the detected signals can be successfully 
characterized and that the fingerprinting technique provided by DILON can be applied to 
inductively coupled RFID systems.     
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APPENDIX A:  Acronyms 
 
Chapter 1 
RFID Radio Frequency Identification 
ASK Amplitude Shift Keying 
DBP Differential Biphase 
EAS  Electronic Article Surveillance 
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory 
EM Electromagnetic 
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
FCC Federal Communications Commission 
FRAM Ferromagnetic Random Access Memory 
FSK Frequency Shift Keying 
HF High Frequency 
IRE Institute of Radio Engineers 
IFF Identification Friend or Foe 
ISM Industrial, Scientific, Medical 
LF Low Frequency 
NRZ Non-Return to Zero 
PPC Pulse-Pause Code 
PSK Phase Shift Keying 
RADAR Radio Detection and Ranging 
SRAM Static Random Access Memory 
UHF Ultra-High Frequency 
  
Chapter 2 
CASPIAN Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering 
DILON Detecting Intrusion at Layer One 
NIC Network Interface Card 
  
Chapter 3 
ACL Access Control List 
EAS Electronic Article Surveillance 
  
Chapter 4 
DHS Department of Homeland Security (United States) 
FDA Food and Drug Administration (United States) 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
PDA Personal Digital Assistant 
  
Chapter 5 
DoS Denial-of-Service 
EPC Electronic Product Code 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
NCVHS National Committee on Vital Health Statistics 
SSN Social Security Number 
  
Chapter 6 
FFT Fast Fourier Transform 
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APPENDIX B:  Illustration of a Tree-Walking Algorithm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Above is a visual example of the tree-walking algorithm used by some readers.   When a 
reader responds with its number, the number is sent through a tree such as the one above, 
significant bit first.  The tree is traversed until the tag’s number is found in one of the 
branches.   In the case of the example above, the serial numbers are shown at the bottom as 
000 – 111.   
 
On a normal basis, the tree is quickly traversed as one side can be completely eliminated 
based on the first bit alone.  However, when a blocker tag is introduced, multiple numbers 
are sent at the same time, confusing the reader as to which side to take first.  So, the entire 
tree is traversed in an effort to find the transmitted numbers, which may take a considerable 
amount of time to accomplish.   
 
 77
APPENDIX C:  Supporting MATLAB Code 
 
This appendix contains code we created in MATLAB to aid in the signal detection and 
characterization process.  
 
 
1. Signal Analysis Function 
 
function [] = sig_analysis(data, descriptor, testday, testnum, recordnum, fs, fc, n, W, M) 
  
%  
% Purpose: This function serves as the main function for  
% analyzing the RFID signals.  It calls two functions – sig_fft() and  
% signal_detectors().  
% 
% Variables: 
% data – data vector being analyzed 
% descriptor - type of transponder used in data collection 
% testday - day test took place 
% testnum - number of the test taken on testday 
% recordnum - a record number from testnum 
% fs - sample frequency 
% fc - center frequency 
% n - filter order for Chebyshev Type II filter 
% Rs - for Chebyshev filter 
% W - for Chebyshev filter 
% M - filter order for Moving Average filter 
%  
% Output: There is no output for this function.  It only produces  
% figures generated by called functions   
% 
  
% Obtain the FFT of the signal (this also shows a plot of the data) 
  sig_fft(data, fs); 
  
% Perform Envelope and Phase Detection 
  [mod_envelope, modified_phase, modified_freq]  
            = signal_detectors(data, descriptor, testday, testnum, samplenum, fs, fc, n, W); 
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2. Signal Time Series Plot and FFT 
 
function [] = sig_fft(data, sampling_rate) 
 
%  
% Purpose:  The purpose of this function is to plot the raw data  
% and obtain an FFT of the data.  
%  
% Variables: 
% data, the data vector being analyzed 
% sampling_rate, the sampling rate used to obtain the raw data 
% 
% Output:  There is no output for this function.  It produces 
% figures for analysis. 
% 
 
% Generate the time vector 
k = length(data)/sampling_rate; 
  
t = 0:length(data)-k; 
  
t = t./sampling_rate;           
  
% Plot the time series data 
figure; plot(t, data); 
xlabel('Time (s)'); 
  
% Obtain the FFT of the data 
n = length(data); 
  
f = (0:n-1)*sampling_rate/n; 
  
fftsignal = fft(data); 
  
% Plot the FFT in dB 
figure; plot(f, 10*log10(abs(fftsignal)));  
xlabel('Frequency (Hz)'); ylabel('Power (dB)'); 
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3. Signal Detector Function 
 
function [mod_envelope, modified_phase, modified_freq]  
                  = signal_detectors(data, descriptor, testday, testnum, samplenum, fs, fc, n, W) 
  
%                                                                                       
% Purpose:  The purpose of this function is to provide envelope,    
% phase, and frequency detection by implementing an envelope      
% detector.  Output from the envelope detector is used for             
% phase and frequency detection.                                  
% 
% Input Variables:                                                                 
% filename, name of file containing data                                     
% fs, sampling rate (Hz)                                                          
% n, filter order                                                                     
% Rs, stopband ripple (dB)                                                     
% W, cutoff frequency for filter                           
%                                                      
% Output:            
% mod_envelope, modified envelope detector output               
% 
  
% Build a Butterworth filter 
Wn = W/(fs/2);                  % Normalized frequency 
[b, a] = butter(n, Wn,'low'); 
  
% Envelope Detection 
y = abs(data); 
  
% Filter the absolute value of the data 
envelope = filter(b, a, y); 
  
  
% Phase Detection 
t = 0:1/fs:(1/fs)*length(data); % Time vector 
  
% Verify the time and data vectors are the same length 
if (length(t) > length(data)) 
    v = length(t) - length(data); 
    t = 0:1/fs:(1/fs)*length(data)-v*(1/fs); 
end 
  
% The Envelope Detector 
sig1 = sin(2*pi*fc*t);       
sig2 = cos(2*pi*fc*t); 
  
track1 = sig1'.*data; 
track2 = sig2'.*data; 
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 % Filter the absolute value of the data 
filter_output1 = filter(b, a, track1); 
filter_output2 = filter(b, a, track2); 
  
output = filter_output1./filter_output2; 
  
% Phase Detection 
phase = atan(output); 
  
  
% Frequency Detection 
freq = diff(phase); 
  
% The first 430 points are artifacts of the filter, so remove them. 
for i = 431:length(envelope) 
    modified_envelope(i-430, 1) = envelope(i); 
end 
  
for i = 431:length(phase) 
    modified_phase(i-430, 1) = phase(i); 
end 
  
for i = 431:length(freq) 
    modified_freq(i-430, 1) = freq(i); 
end 
   
% Average the output of the envelope detector. 
envelope_avg = mean(modified_envelope); 
mod_envelope = modified_envelope - envelope_avg; 
  
t2 = 431/fs:1/fs:(1/fs)*length(data); % A new time vector           
p = length(mod_envelope); 
f = (0:p-1)*fs/p;                      % Frequency 
  
% Plot the output from the detectors. 
figure;  
subplot(2, 2, 1); plot(t2, modified_envelope); xlabel('Time (s)'); ylabel('Envelope Detector Output'); 
title(['Detections for ', descriptor, int2str(testday), ': Test', int2str(testnum), ': Record', 
int2str(samplenum)], 'fontsize', 14, 'fontweight', 'bold'); 
subplot(2, 2, 2); plot(t2, mod_envelope); xlabel('Time (s)'); ylabel('Envelope Detector Output'); 
subplot(2, 2, 3); plot(t2, modified_phase); xlabel('Time (s)'); ylabel('Phase Detector Output'); 
subplot(2, 2, 4); plot(modified_freq); xlabel('Datapoints'); ylabel('Instantaneous Frequency');  
  
figure;  
plot(t2, mod_envelope); xlabel('Time (s)'); ylabel('Envelope Detector Output'); title('Averaged 
Envelope Detector Output'); 
figure;  
plot(f, 10*log10(abs(mod_env_fft))); xlabel('Frequency (Hz)'); ylabel('Power'); title('FFT of 
Averaged Envelope Detector Output');    
 
